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Abstract. Adversarial robustness has become a central goal in deep
learning, both in the theory and the practice. However, successful meth-
ods to improve the adversarial robustness (such as adversarial training)
greatly hurt generalization performance on the unperturbed data. This
could have a major impact on how the adversarial robustness affects real
world systems (i.e. many may opt to forego robustness if it can improve
accuracy on the unperturbed data). We propose Interpolated Adversarial
Training, which employs recently proposed interpolation based training
methods in the framework of adversarial training. On CIFAR-10, ad-
versarial training increases the standard test error ( when there is no
adversary) from 4.43% to 12.32%, whereas with our Interpolated ad-
versarial training we retain the adversarial robustness while achieving a
standard test error of only 6.45%. With our technique, the relative in-
crease in the standard error for the robust model is reduced from 178.1%
to just 45.5%.
Keywords: Adversarial Robustness · Mixup · Manifold Mixup · Stan-
dard Test Error
1 Introduction
Deep neural networks have been highly successful across a variety of tasks. This
success has driven applications in the areas where reliability and security are crit-
ical, including face recognition [20], self-driving cars [6], health care, and malware
detection [15]. Security concerns emerge when adversaries of the system stand to
benefit from a system performing poorly. Work on Adversarial examples [22] has
shown that neural networks are vulnerable to the attacks perturbing the data
in imperceptible ways. Many defenses have been proposed, but most of them
rely on obfuscated gradients [1] to give a false illusion of defense by lowering
the quality of the gradient signal, without actually improving robustness [1]. Of
these defenses, only adversarial training [14] was still effective after addressing
the problem of obfuscated gradients.
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However, adversarial training has a major disadvantage: it drastically reduces
the generalization performance of the networks on unperturbed data samples,
especially for small networks. For example, [16] reports that adding adversarial
training to a specific model increases the standard test error from 6.3% to 21.6%
on CIFAR-10. This phenomenon makes adversarial training difficult to use in
practice. If the tension between the performance and the security turns out to
be irreconcilable, then many systems would either need to perform poorly or
accept vulnerability, a situation leading to great negative impact.
Our contribution: We propose to augment the adversarial training with
the interpolation based training, as a solution to the above problem.
– We demonstrate that our approach substantially improves standard test er-
ror while still achieving adversarial robustness, using benchmark datasets
(CIFAR10 and SHVN) and benchmark architectures (Wide-ResNet and ResNet):
Section 5.1.
– We demonstrate that our approach does not suffer from obfuscated gradient
problem by performing black-box attacks on the models trained with our
approach: Section 5.2.
– We perform PGD attack of higher number of steps (upto 1000 steps) and
higher value of maximum allowed perturbation/distortion epsilon, to demon-
strate that the adversarial robustness of our approach remains at the same
level as that of the adversarial training : Section 5.3.
– We demonstrate that the networks trained with our approach have lower
complexity, hence resulting in improved standard test error : Section 5.4.
2 Related Work
The trade-off between standard test error and adversarial robustness
has been studied in [16,24,18,32]. While [16,24,32] empirically demonstrate this
trade-off, [24,32] demonstrate this trade-off theoretically as well on the con-
structed learning problems. Furthermore, [18] study this trade-off from the point-
of-view of the statistical properties of the robust objective [4] and the dynamics of
optimizing a robust objective on a neural network, and suggest that adversarial
training requires more data to obtain a lower standard test error. Our results on
SVHN and CIFAR-10 (Section 5.1) also consistently show higher standard test
error with PGD adversarial training.
While [24] presented data dependent proofs showing that on certain artifi-
cially constructed distributions - it is impossible for a robust classifier to gen-
eralize as good as a non-robust classifier. How this relates to our results is an
intriguing question. Our results suggest that the generalization gap between ad-
versarial training and non-robust models can be substantially reduced through
better algorithms, but it remains possible that closing this gap entirely on some
datasets is impossible. An important question for future work is how much this
generalization gap can be explained in terms of inherent data properties and
how much this gap can be addressed through better models.
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Neural Architecture Search [34] was used to find architectures which achieve
high robustness to PGD attacks as well as better test error on the unperturbed
data [8]. This improved test error on the unperturbed data and a direct compar-
ison to our method is in Table 1. However, the method of [8] is computationally
very expensive as each experiment requires training thousands of models to
search for optimal architectures (9360 child models each trained for 10 epochs
in [8]), whereas our method involves no significant additional computation.
In our work we primarily concern ourselves with adversarial training, but
techniques in the research area of the provable defenses have also shown a trade-
off between robustness and generalization on unperturbed data. For example,
the dual network defense of [12] reported 20.38% standard test error on SVHN
for their provably robust convolutional network (most non-robust models are
well under 5% test error on SVHN). [27] reported a best standard test accuracy
of 29.23% using a convolutional ResNet on CIFAR-10 (most non-robust ResNets
have accuracy of well over 90%). Our goal here is not to criticize this work, as
developing provable defenses is a challenging and important area of work, but
rather to show that this problem that we explore with Interpolated Adversar-
ial Training (on adversarial training [16] type defenses) is just as severe with
provable defenses, and understanding if the insights developed here carry over
to provable defenses, could be an interesting area for future work.
Adversarially robust generalization: Another line of research concerns
adversarially robust generalization: the performance of adversarially trained net-
works on adversarial test examples. [19] observe that a higher sample complexity
is needed for better adversarially robust generalization. [28] demonstrate that
adversarial training results in higher complexity models and hence poorer ad-
versarially robust generalization. Furthermore, [19] suggest that adversarially
robust generalization requires more data and [30,7] demonstrate that unlabeled
data can be used to improve adversarially robust generalization. In contrast to
their work, in this work we focus on improving the generalization performance
on unperturbed samples (standard test error), while maintaining robustness on
unseen adversarial examples at the same level.
Interpolation based training techniques: Yet another line of research
[33,25,26,5] shows that simple interpolation based training techniques are able to
substantially decrease standard test error in fully-supervised and semi-supervised
learning paradigms. Along these lines, [31] studies the theoretical properties of
interpolation based training techniques such as Mixup [33]
3 Background
3.1 The Empirical Risk Minimization Framework
Let us consider a general classification task with an underlying data distribution
D which consists of examples x ∈ X and corresponding labels y ∈ Y. The
task is to learn a function f : X → Y such that for a given x, f outputs
corresponding y. It can be done by minimizing the risk E(x,y)∼D[L(x, y, θ)], where
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L(θ, x, y) is a suitable loss function for instance the cross-entropy loss and θ ∈
Rp is the set of parameters of function f . Since this expectation cannot be
computed, therefore a common approach is to to minimize the empirical risk
1/N
∑N
i=1 L(xi, yi, θ) taking into account only a finite number of examples drawn
from the data distribution D, namely (x1, y1), ......, (xN , yN ) .
3.2 Adversarial Attacks and Robustness
While the empirical risk minimization framework has been very successful and of-
ten leads to excellent generalization on the unperturbed test examples, it has the
significant limitation that it doesn’t guarantee good performance on examples
which are carefully perturbed to fool the model. [22,10]. That is, the empiri-
cal risk minimization framework suffers from a lack of robustness to adversarial
attacks.
[16] proposed an optimization view of adversarial robustness, in which the
adversarial robustness of a model is defined as a min-max problem. Using this
view, the parameters θ of a function f are learned by minimizing ρ(θ) as de-
scribed in Equation 1. S defines a region of points around each example, which is
typically selected so that it only contains visually imperceptible perturbations.
min
θ
ρ(θ), where ρ(θ) = E(x,y)∼D
[
max
δ∈S
L(θ, x+ δ, y)
]
(1)
Adversarial attacks can be broadly categorized into two categories: Single-
step attacks and Multi-step attacks. We evaluated the performance of our model
as a defense against the most popular and well-studied adversarial attack from
each of these categories. Firstly, we consider the Fast Gradient Sign Method [10]
which is a single step and can still be effective against many networks. Secondly,
we consider the projected gradient descent attack [14] which is a multi-step
attack. It is slower than FGSM as it requires many iterations, but has been
shown to be a much stronger attack [16]. We briefly describe these two attacks
as follows:
Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM). The Fast Gradient Sign Method
[10] produces `∞ bounded adversaries by the following the sign of the gradient
based perturbation. This attack is cheap since it only relies on computing the
gradient once and is often an effective attack against deep networks [16,10],
especially when no adversarial defenses are employed.
x˜ = x+ ε sgn(∇xL(θ, x, y)). (2)
Projected Gradient Descent (PGD). The projected gradient descent
attack [16], sometimes referred to as FGSMk, is a multi-step extension of the
FGSM attack characterized as follows:
xt+1 = Πx+S
(
xt + α sgn(∇xL(θ, x, y))
)
. (3)
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initialized with x0 as the clean input x. S formalizes the manipulative power of
the adversary. Π refers to the projection operator, which in this context means
projecting the adversarial example back onto the region within an S radius of
the original data point, after each step of size α in the adversarial attack.
3.3 Gradient Obfuscation by Adversarial Defenses
Many approaches have been proposed as a defense against adversarial attacks.
A significant challenge with evaluating defenses against adversarial attacks is
that many attacks rely upon a network’s gradient. The defense methods which
reduce the quality of this gradient, either by making it flatter or noisier can lead
to methods which lower the effectiveness of gradient-based attacks, but which
are not actually robust to adversarial examples [2,17]. This process, which has
been referred to as gradient masking or gradient obfuscation, must be analyzed
when studying the strength of an adversarial defense.
One method for examining the extent to which an adversarial defense gives
deceptively good results as a result of gradient obfuscation relies on the observa-
tion that black-box attacks are a strict subset of white-box attacks, so white-box
attacks should always be at least as strong as black-box attacks. If a method re-
ports much better defense against white-box attacks than the black-box attack,
it suggests that the selected white-box attack is underpowered as a result of the
gradient obfuscation. Another test for gradient obfuscation is to run an iterative
search, such as projected gradient descent (PGD) with an unlimited range for
a large number of iterations. If such an attack is not completely successful, it
indicates that the model’s gradients are not an effective method for searching for
adversarial images, and that gradient obfuscation is occurring. We demonstrate
successful results with Interpolated Adversarial Training on these sanity checks
in Section 5.2. Still another test is to confirm that iterative attacks with small
step sizes always outperform single-step attacks with larger step sizes (such as
FGSM). If this is not the case, it may suggest that the iterative attack becomes
stuck in regions where optimization using gradients is poor due to gradient mask-
ing. In all of our experiments for Interpolated Adversarial Training , we found
that the iterative PGD attacks with smaller step sizes and more iterations were
always stronger than the FGSM attacks (which take a single large step) against
our models, as shown in Table 1, Table 2, Table 3 and Table 4.
3.4 Adversarial Training
Adversarial training [10] encompasses crafting adversarial examples and using
them during training to increase robustness against unseen adversarial examples.
To scale adversarial training to large datasets and large models, often the ad-
versarial examples are crafted using the fast single step methods such as FGSM.
However, adversarial training with fast single step methods remains vulnerable
to adversarial attacks from a stronger multi-step attack such as PGD. Thus, in
this work, we consider adversarial training with PGD.
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4 Interpolated Adversarial Training
We propose Interpolated Adversarial Training (IAT), which trains on interpola-
tions of adversarial examples along with interpolations of unperturbed examples.
We use the techniques of Mixup [33] and Manifold Mixup[25] as ways of interpo-
lating examples. Learning is performed in the following four steps when training
a network with Interpolated Adversarial Training . In the first step, we compute
the loss from a unperturbed (non-adversarial) batch (with interpolations based
on either Mixup or Manifold Mixup). In the second step, we generate a batch
of adversarial examples using an adversarial attack (such as Projected Gradient
Descent (PGD) [16] or Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [10]). In the third
step, we train against these adversarial examples with the original labels, with
interpolations based on either Mixup or Manifold Mixup. In the fourth step, we
obtain the average of the loss from the unperturbed batch and the adversarial
batch and update the network parameters using this loss. Note that following
[13,24], we use both the unperturbed and adversarial samples to train the model
Interpolated Adversarial Training and we use it in our baseline adversarial train-
ing models as well. The detailed algorithm is described in Algorithm Block 1.
As Interpolated Adversarial Training combines adversarial training with ei-
ther Mixup [33] or Manifold Mixup [25], we summarize these supporting methods
in more detail. The Mixup method [33] consists of drawing a pair of samples from
the dataset (xi, yi) ∼ pD and (xj , yj) ∼ pD and then taking a random linear in-
terpolation in the input space x˜ = λxi + (1− λ)xj . This λ is sampled randomly
on each update (typically from a Beta distribution). Then the network fθ is run
forward on the interpolated input x˜ and trained using the same linear interpo-
lation of the losses L = λL(fθ(x˜), yi) + (1 − λ)L(fθ(x˜), yj). Here L refers to a
loss function such as cross entropy.
The Manifold Mixup method [25] is closely related to Mixup from a compu-
tational perspective, except that the layer at which interpolation is performed,
is selected randomly on each training update.
Adversarial training consists of generating adversarial examples and training
the model to give these points the original label. For generating these adversarial
examples during training, we used the Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) at-
tack, which is also known as iterative FGSM. This attack consists of repeatedly
updating an adversarial perturbation by moving in the direction of the sign of
the gradient multiplied by some step size, while projecting back to an L∞ ball
by clipping the perturbation to maximum . Both , the step size to move on
each iteration, and the number of iterations are hyperparameters for the attack.
Why Interpolated Adversarial Training helps to improve the stan-
dard test accuracy: We present two arguments for why Interpolated Adver-
sarial Training can improve standard test accuracy:
Increasing the training set size: [18] has shown that adversarial training
could require more training samples to attain a higher standard test accuracy.
Mixup [33] and Manifold Mixup [25] can be seen as the techniques that increase
Title Suppressed Due to Excessive Length 7
Algorithm 1 The Interpolated Adversarial Training Algorithm
Require: fθ: Neural Network
Require: Mix: A way of combining examples (Mixup or Manifold Mixup )
Require: D: Data samples
Require: N : Total number of updates
Require: Loss: A function which runs the neural network with Mix applied
for k = 1, . . . , N do
Sample (xi, yi) ∼ D . Sample batch
Lc = Loss(fθ,Mix, xi, yi) . Compute loss on unperturbed data
using Mixup ( or Manifold Mixup)
x˜i = attack(xi, yi) . Run attack (e.g. PGD [16])
La = Loss(fθ,Mix, x˜i, yi) . Compute adversarial loss on adversarial
samples using Mixup (or Manifold Mixup)
L = (Lc + La)/2 . Combined loss
g ← ∇θL . Gradients of the combined Loss
θ ← Step(θ, gθ) . Update parameters using gradients g (e.g. SGD )
end for
the effective size of the training set by creating novel training samples. Hence
these techniques can be useful in improving standard test accuracy.
Information compression: [23,21] have shown a relationship between com-
pression of information in the features learned by deep networks and generaliza-
tion. This relates the degree to which deep networks compress the information
in their hidden states to bounds on generalization, with a stronger bound when
the deep networks have stronger compression.
To evaluate the effect of adversarial training on compression of the informa-
tion in the features, we performed an experiment where we take the represen-
tations learned after training, and study how well these frozen representations
are able to successfully predict fixed random labels. If the model compresses the
representations well, then it will be harder to fit random labels. In particular,
we ran a small 2-layer MLP on top of the learned representations to fit ran-
dom binary labels. In all cases we trained the model with the random labels for
200 epochs with the same hyperparameters. For fitting 10000 randomly labeled
examples, we achieved accuracy of: 92.08% (Baseline) and 97.00% (PGD Ad-
versarial Training): showing that adversarial training made the representations
much less compressed.
Manifold Mixup [25] has shown to learn more compressed features. Hence,
employing Manifold Mixup with the adversarial training might mitigate the
adverse effect of the adversarial training. Using the same experimental setup
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as above, we achieved accuracy of : 64.17% (Manifold Mixup) and 71.00% (IAT
using Manifold Mixup).
These results suggest that adversarial training causes the learned represen-
tations to be less compressed which may be the reason for poor standard test
accuracy. At the same time, IAT with Manifold Mixup significantly reduces the
ability of the model to learn less compressed features, which may potentially
improve standard test accuracy.
5 Experiments
5.1 Adversarial Robustness
The goal of our experiments is to provide empirical support for our two ma-
jor assertions: that adversarial training hurts performance on unperturbed data
(which is consistent with what has been previously observed [16,24,32]) and to
show that this difference can be reduced with our Interpolated Adversarial Train-
ing method. Finally, we want to show that Interpolated Adversarial Training is
adversarially robust and does not suffer from gradient obfuscation [1].
In our experiments we always perform adversarial training using a 7-step
PGD attack but we evaluate on a variety of attacks: FGSM, PGD (with a varying
number of steps and hyperparameters).
Architecture and Datasets: We conducted experiments on competitive
networks to demonstrate that Interpolated Adversarial Training can improve
generalization performance without sacrificing adversarial robustness. We used
two architectures : First, the WideResNet architecture proposed in [11,29] and
used in [16] for adversarial training 3. Second, the PreActResnet18 architecture
which is a variant of the residual architecture of [11]. We used SGD with mo-
mentum optimizer in our experiments. We ran the experiments for 200 epochs
with initial learning rate is 0.1 and it is annealed by a factor of 0.1 at epoch 100
and 150. We use the batch-size of 64 for all the experiments.
We used two benchmark datasets (CIFAR10 and SVHN), which are com-
monly used in the adversarial robustness literature [16]. The CIFAR-10 dataset
consists of 60000 color images each of size 32 × 32, split between 50K training
and 10K test images. This dataset has ten classes, which include pictures of cars,
horses, airplanes and deer. The SVHN dataset consists of 73257 training samples
and 26032 test samples each of size 32 × 32. Each example is a close-up image
of a house number (the ten classes are the digits from 0-9)
3 While [16] use WRN32-10 architecture, we use the standard WRN28-10 architecture,
so our results are not directly comparable to their results.
5 Since the objective of this work is to demonstrate the effectiveness the Interpolated
Adversarial Training over adversarial training for improving the standard test error
as well as maintaining the adversarial robustness to the same levels, we highlight
the best results in the lower part of the Table: the methods in the upper part of the
Table have better standard test error (”No-attack” column), but their adversarial
robustness is very poor against strong adversarial attacks (PGD, 7 steps and 20
steps)
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Table 1. CIFAR10 results (error in %) to white-box attacks on WideResNet20-10
evaluated on the test data. The rows correspond to the training mechanism and columns
correspond to adversarial attack methods. The upper part of the Table consists of
training mechanisms that do not employ any explicit adversarial defense. The lower part
of the Table consist of methods that employ adversarial training as a defense mechanism
5. For PGD, we used a `∞ projected gradient descent with size α = 2, and  = 8.
For FGSM, we used  = 8. Our method of Interpolated Adversarial Training improves
standard test error in comparison to adversarial training (refer to the first column) and
maintains the adversarial robustness on the same level as that of adversarial training.
The method of [8] is close to our method in terms of standard test error and adversarial
robustness however it needs several orders of magnitude more computation (it trains
9360 models) for its neural architecture search.
XXXXXXXXXXTraining
Adversary
No Attack FGSM PGD (7 steps) PGD (20 steps)
Baseline
[16]
4.80 67.3 95.9 96.5
Baseline 4.43±0.09 56.92±0.79 99.83±0.02 100.0±0.0
Mixup 3.25±0.11 32.63±0.88 92.75±0.61 99.27±0.03
Manifold Mixup 3.15±0.09 38.41±2.64 89.77±3.68 98.34±1.03
Neural Architecture Search [8] 6.80 36.4 49.9 -
PGD (7 steps) [16] 12.70 43.90 50.00 54.20
PGD (7 steps) (our code) 12.32±0.14 41.87±0.04 50.97±0.15 54.87±0.16
Interpolated Adversarial Training
(with Mixup)
6.45±0.52 33.83±0.86 49.88±0.55 54.89±1.37
Interpolated Adversarial Training
(Manifold Mixup)
6.48±0.30 35.18±0.30 50.08±0.48 55.18±0.18
Table 2. CIFAR10 results (error in %) to white-box attacks on PreActResnet18. Rest
of the details are same as Table 1
XXXXXXXXXXTraining
Adversary
No Attack FGSM PGD (7 steps) PGD (20 steps)
Baseline 5.88±0.16 78.11±1.31 99.85±0.18 100.0 ±0.0
Mixup 4.42±0.03 38.32±0.76 97.48±0.15 99.88±0.02
Manifold Mixup 4.10±0.09 37.57±1.31 88.50±3.20 97.80±1.02
PGD (7 steps) 14.12±0.06 48.56±0.14 57.76±0.19 61.00±0.24
Interpolated Adversarial Training
(with Mixup)
10.12±0.33 40.71±0.65 55.43±0.45 61.62±1.01
Interpolated Adversarial Training
(Manifold Mixup)
10.30±0.15 42.48±0.29 55.78±0.67 61.80±0.51
Data Pre-Processing and Hyperparameters: The data augmentation
and pre-processing is exactly the same as in [16]. Namely, we use random crop-
ping and horizontal flip for CIFAR10. For SVHN, we use random cropping. We
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Table 3. SVHN results (error in %) to white-box attacks on WideResNet20-10 using
the 26032 test examples. The rows correspond to the training mechanism and columns
correspond to adversarial attack methods. For PGD, we used a `∞ projected gradient
descent with step-size α = 2, and  = 8. For FGSM, we used  = 8. Our method of
Interpolated Adversarial Training improves standard test error and adversarial robust-
ness.
XXXXXXXXXXTraining
Adversary
No Attack FGSM PGD (7 steps) PGD (20 steps)
Baseline 3.07±0.03 39.36±1.16 94.00±0.65 98.59±0.13
Mixup 2.59±0.08 26.93±1.96 90.18±3.43 98.78±0.79
Manifold Mixup 2.46±0.01 29.74±0.99 77.49±3.82 94.77±1.34
PGD (7 steps) 6.14±0.13 29.10±0.72 46.97±0.49 53.47±0.52
Interpolated Adversarial Training
(with Mixup)
3.47±0.11 22.08±0.15 45.74±0.11 58.40±0.46
Interpolated Adversarial Training
(Manifold Mixup)
3.38±0.22 22.30±1.07 42.61±0.40 52.79±0.22
Table 4. SVHN results (error in %) to white-box attacks on PreActResnet18. Rest of
the details are same as Table 3.
XXXXXXXXXXTraining
Adversary
No Attack FGSM PGD (7 steps) PGD (20 steps)
Baseline 3.47±0.09 50.73±0.22 96.37±0.12 98.61±0.06
Mixup 2.91±0.06 31.91±0.59 98.43±0.85 99.95±0.02
Manifold Mixup 2.66±0.02 29.86±3.60 72.47±1.82 94.00±0.96
PGD (7 steps) 5.27±0.13 26.78±0.62 47.00±0.22 54.40±0.42
Interpolated Adversarial Training
(with Mixup)
3.63±0.05 23.57±0.64 47.69±0.22 54.62±0.18
Interpolated Adversarial Training
(Manifold Mixup)
3.61±0.22 24.95±0.92 46.62±0.28 54.13±1.08
use the per-image standardization for pre-processing. For adversarial training,
we generated the adversarial examples using a PGD adversary using a `∞ pro-
jected gradient descent with 7 steps of size 2, and  = 8. For the adversarial
attack, we used an FGSM adversary with  = 8 and a PGD adversary with 7
steps and 20 steps of size 2 and  = 8.
In the Interpolated Adversarial Training experiments, for generating the ad-
versarial examples, we used PGD with the same hyper-parameters as described
above. For performing interpolation, we used either Manifold Mixup with α = 2.0
as suggested in [25] or Mixup with alpha = 1.0 as suggested in [33]. For Mani-
fold Mixup, we performed the interpolation at a randomly chosen layer from the
input layer, the output of the first resblock or the output of the second resblock,
as recommended in [25].
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Results: The results are presented in Table 1, Table 2, Table 3 and Table 4.
We observe that IAT consistently improves standard test error relative to mod-
els using just adversarial training, while maintaining adversarial robustness at
the same level. For example, in Table 1, we observe that the baseline model (no
adversarial training) has standard test error of 4.43% whereas PGD adversar-
ial increase the standard test error to 12.32%: a relative increase of 178% in
standard test error. With Interpolated Adversarial Training , the standard test
error is reduced to 6.45%, a relative increase of only 45% in standard test error
as compared to the baseline, while the degree of adversarial robustness remains
approximately unchanged, across varies type of adversarial attacks.
5.2 Transfer Attacks
As a sanity check that Interpolated Adversarial Training does not suffer from gra-
dient obfuscation [1], we performed a transfer attack evaluation on the CIFAR-10
dataset using the PreActResNet18 architecture. In this type of evaluation, the
model which is used to generate the adversarial examples is different from the
model used to evaluate the attack. As these transfer attacks do not use the tar-
get model’s parameters to compute the adversarial example, they are considered
black-box attacks. In our evaluation (Table 5) we found that black-box transfer
were always substantially weaker than white-box attacks, hence Interpolated Ad-
versarial Training does not suffer from gradient obfuscation [1]. Additionally, in
Table 6, we observe that increasing  results in 100% success of attack, provid-
ing added evidence that Interpolated Adversarial Training does not suffer from
gradient obfuscation [1].
Table 5. Transfer Attack evaluation of Interpolated Adversarial Training on CIFAR-
10 reported in terms of error rate (%). Here we consider three trained models, using
normal adversarial training (Adv), IAT with mixup (IAT-M), and IAT with manifold
mixup (IAT-MM). On each experiment, we generate adversarial examples only using
the model listed in the column and then evaluate these adversarial examples on the
target model listed in the row. Note that in all of our experiments white box attacks
(where the attacking model and target models are the same) led to stronger attacks
than black box attacks, which is the evidence that our approach does not suffer from
gradient obfuscation [1].
 2 5 10
PPPPPPPTarget
Attack Adv.
Train
IAT
M
IAT
MM
Adv.
Train
IAT
M
IAT
MM
Adv.
Train
IAT
M
IAT
MM
Adv. Train 28.54 21.11 21.87 43.68 28.10 29.21 74.66 44.39 48.14
IAT-M 17.14 25.57 18.07 25.02 45.03 28.85 48.74 78.49 51.35
IAT-MM 18.57 18.74 25.71 26.84 26.7 43.23 50.43 48.11 77.05
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5.3 Varying the number of iterations and  for Iterative Attacks
To further study the robustness of Interpolated Adversarial Training , we studied
the effect of changing the number of attack iterations and the range of the adver-
sarial attack . Some adversarial defenses [9] have been found to have increasing
vulnerability when exposed to attacks with a large number of iterations. We
studied this (Table 7) and found that both adversarial training and Interpolated
Adversarial Training have robustness which declines only slightly with an in-
creasing number of steps, with almost no difference between the 100 step attack
and the 1000 step attack. Additionally we varied the  to study if Interpolated
Adversarial Training was more or less vulnerable to attacks with  different from
what the model was trained on. We found that Interpolated Adversarial Train-
ing is somewhat more robust when using smaller  and slightly less robust when
using larger  (Table 6).
Table 6. Robustness on CIFAR-10 PreActResNet18 (Error %) with increasing  and
a fixed number of iterations (20). Interpolated Adversarial Training and adversarial
training both have similar degradation in robustness with increasing , but Interpolated
Adversarial Training tends to be slightly better for smaller  and adversarial training
is slightly better for larger 
XXXXXXXXXXModel
Attack 
1 2 10 15 20 25 50
Adversarial Training 21.44 28.54 74.66 92.43 98.53 99.77 100.0
IAT (Mixup) 17.90 25.57 78.49 93.73 98.54 99.72 100.0
IAT (Manifold Mixup) 18.24 25.71 77.05 93.31 98.67 99.85 100.0
Table 7. Robustness on CIFAR-10 PreActResNet-18 (Error %) with fixed  = 5 and
a variable number of iterations used for the adversarial attack.
hhhhhhhhhhhhhhhModel
Num. Iterations
5 10 20 50 100 1000
Adversarial Training 42.35 43.44 43.68 43.76 43.80 43.83
IAT (Mixup) 41.29 44.23 45.03 45.31 45.42 45.56
IAT (Manifold Mixup) 40.74 42.72 43.23 43.43 43.51 43.60
5.4 Analysis of the complexity of the trained models
In this section, we present the analysis of the networks learned using Interpolated
Adversarial Training . The spectral complexity measure proposed by [3] suggests
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that the complexity of a deep network is a function of the frobenius norm and
spectral norm of its weight matrices and that this spectral complexity can be
used to prove a generalization bound. We computed both of these norms on a
small 6-layer fully-connected network with 512 hidden units trained on Fashion-
MNIST (Figure 1). We found that Adversarial Training increases the weight
matrices frobenius norms across all the layers and increases the spectral norm
of the majority of the layers. This is preliminary evidence that Interpolated
Adversarial Training learns lower complexity classifiers than normal adversarial
training.
Fig. 1. We analyzed the frobenius and spectral norms of the weight matrices on a
6-layer network. Generally Adversarial Training makes these norms larger, whereas
Interpolated Adversarial Training brings these norms closer to their values when doing
normal training.
6 Conclusion
Robustness to the adversarial examples is essential for ensuring that machine
learning systems are secure and reliable. However the most effective defense,
adversarial training, has the effect of harming performance on the unperturbed
data. This has both the theoretical and the practical significance. As adversarial
perturbations are imperceptible (or barely perceptible) to humans and humans
are able to generalize extremely well, it is surprising that adversarial training
reduces the model’s ability to perform well on unperturbed test data. This degra-
dation in the generalization is critically urgent to the practitioners whose systems
are threatened by the adversarial attacks. With current techniques those wishing
to deploy machine learning systems need to consider a severe trade-off between
performance on the unperturbed data and the robustness to the adversarial ex-
amples, which may mean that security and reliability will suffer in important
applications. Our work has addressed both of these issues. We proposed to ad-
dress this by augmenting adversarial training with interpolation based training
14 Lamb et al.
[33,25]. We found that this substantially improves generalization on unperturbed
data while preserving adversarial robustness.
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